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OUR POLICY IN CHINA.

BY MARK B. DUNNELL, FORMERLY DEPUTY CONSUL-GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES AT SHANGHAI.

CHINA has been given a new lease of life. Not her own strength, but the jealousies and fears of England, Germany, Russia and France have averted the threatened partition. She has secured a short stay of execution by yielding every demand. If, in the respite, she fails to introduce necessary reforms and put herself in a strong defensive condition, there will be little sympathy for her in any future humiliations that may befall.

Although the powers have stopped short of partition, they have secured concessions that will work a fundamental change in their relation to China and one another in the Far East. Although our Government has stood aloof in the recent negotiations, it has not been because we were not concerned, but rather in accordance with our customary practice of culpably ignoring our interests abroad. As respects number of residents and volume of trade, the United States has larger interests in China than any European power save England. And yet, when these large interests were threatened, our Government ignominiously left their defence to England. If the administration has any policy in China it would appear to be the inglorious one of leaving England to fight unaided the battle for open markets, and then come in and enjoy the fruits of her valor under the "most favored nation clause." A mere statement of the recent changes in China and the dangers that still threaten our treaty rights will make clear our true policy.

Russia has gained more than any other power, for Manchuria has become a Russian province in all but name. The subtle, patient, bold diplomacy of Russia has achieved a notable victory.

Russia has long known exactly what she wanted in the Far East, and she has pursued her aim with admirable steadiness of purpose. There has been none of the weak vacillation of a "government by discussion." Indeed, the peaceful acquisition of Manchuria must be accounted the most brilliant diplomatic triumph of the century. A territory exceeding in area England and France combined has been won without firing a gun or losing a single life, and without the payment of any consideration whatever. True, the nominal sovereignty of China is retained to "save the face" of the Chinese government, but the substance of sovereignty has passed irrevocably to the Muscovite. He can wait with a light heart and characteristic patience for the coming of an opportune moment to assume absolute dominion.

This last move of Russia should be considered in the light of a little history. The territory of the Amur was an unknown land to the Russians until about the middle of the seventeenth century. The first Russian expedition into that region was under the leadership of an adventurer named Poyarkoff, who, in 1636, sailed down the river from Irkutsk to its mouth. As early as 1682 the Russians had a settlement on the Amur at Albasin. By the treaty of Nerchinsk, signed in 1689 and confirmed in 1728, the Russians were forced to evacuate all their settlements on the Amur and acknowledge the sovereignty of China over the basin of that river. The dominion of China remained unquestioned until toward the middle of the present century, when the Russian Government desired to send supplies to its settlements in Kamchatka by way of the Amur. In 1847, General Muravieff, who was in command of Western Siberia, sent an officer to explore the river. Several surveys were made, and in 1851, Nikolaievsk and Mariinsk were founded near the mouth of the Amur by the commanding officer of a Russian man-of-war as posts of the recently formed Russo-American Trading Company. In 1853 Alexandrovsk and Konstantinovsk were founded on the coast. All these settlements were within territory admitted by Russia in the treaty of Nerchinsk to belong to China. In 1854, General Muravieff asked permission of the local Chinese authorities to send supplies to the Russia settlements on the Pacific down the Amur. His very reasonable request was denied. As the Crimean War was then raging, the Amur afforded the only available route. It was a case of necessity. Accordingly, General Muravieff pro-

ceeded down the river with a large convoy of barges and a thousand men. Again in 1855 expeditions were sent down the river with military stores and provisions and many colonists. Russian stations were established at several points along the north shore of the river against the feeble protests of the local mandarins. Owing to the Taiping rebellion, the government at Peking was unable to oppose by force this Russian occupation. The weakness of China was an invitation to the bold diplomacy of Russia. By means that have never been made public, she succeeded in 1858 in extorting from China the astonishing treaty of Aigun, by which the whole of the left bank of the Amur was ceded unconditionally and without compensation to Russia. This forced gift of China was organized into Primorsk province. Brilliant and unaccountable as this diplomatic achievement was, it was soon followed by one still more brilliant and unaccountable. In 1860, when the Taipings were masters of the greater part of China, and France and England were at the gates of Peking, Russia forced China to cede to her all of Eastern Manchuria as far south as Korea. China received no compensation whatever for thus ceding an immense territory and cutting herself off from the Pacific. The secret means by which Russia secured this extraordinary grant still remain secret.

No further move was made by Russia until 1895, when, at the close of the war between China and Japan, the latter demanded, as a condition of peace, the Liao-tung peninsula. This position would have given Japan control of all Manchuria and kept Russia beyond the Amur. It was intolerable that Russia should build a railroad across the continent and thus be cut off from an ice-free terminus on the Pacific. Supported by Germany and France, Russia compelled Japan to withdraw the demand, and in this action she was clearly justified. Manchuria was thus saved to China, but it was perfectly well understood at the time that Russia was to be granted a right to build her railroad across the country and find an ice-free post at Talien-wan.

In 1896, Russia was formally conceded the right to extend her Trans-Siberia Railroad across Manchuria. Under this concession the road will probably begin at the Onon station of the Trans-Baikal Railroad and cross the Chinese frontier near the town of Staro-Zurukhait, running in Manchuria southeasterly through Tsitsihar, Petuna and Ninguta, and connecting with the

South Ussuri Railroad at Nikolks, to which point trains are now running from Vladivostok. In March of the present year Russia secured the further right to connect this line with a road running from Port Arthur and Talien-wan northward through Moukden and Kirin to Petuna. It is believed, upon evidence that is well nigh conclusive, that Russia has already secured, by secret convention, the right to police the territory through which these railroads will pass. This is to be done ostensibly to "protect" the railroads, but, of course, it will eventuate in the military government of the country. It is also believed that she has secured the right to develop the mines of Manchuria and "reform" the military system.

Finally, the control of Manchuria by Russia was unequivocally and irrevocably fixed by a convention signed at Peking last March. The following notice of this convention was given to the powers by Russia through her foreign ministers:

"By virtue of a convention signed at Peking on March 27, Port Arthur and the port of Talien-wan, and the territories adjacent, have been ceded to Russia in usufruct by China. You are requested to notify the foregoing government whereto you are accredited, adding that the above-mentioned ports and territories will be immediately occupied by Russian troops, and that the Russian flag will be hoisted by the side of the Chinese flag. You may at the same time inform the foreign minister that the port of Talien-wan will be open to foreign trade, and that the largest measure of hospitality will be extended to the ships of all friendly nations."

An official communication issued to the press adds:

"The concessions are for twenty-five years, but may be extended later by common accord. Further, China has conceded the right of constructing a railroad to connect the ports with the Trans-Siberian main line."

Manchuria has an estimated population of 23,000,000. It is the land of the Manchus, who, in 1644, conquered China and established the present dynasty. Its native population has been very largely withdrawn to garrison the cities of China. On the other hand, Manchuria has been overrun by Chinese from Northern China. So extensive has been this migration to and from China that Manchuria has become in race, language and customs an integral part of the Chinese Empire. The climate is very similar to that of Minnesota and Manitoba. The winters are extremely cold, with abundant fall of snow, but the sky is clear and the atmosphere dry and bracing, so that much outdoor activity is possible. The summers are short, but long and warm enough to ripen the finest cereal crops of China. Magnificent crops of

maize, wheat, barley, hemp, rice and millet are raised in Southern and Central Manchuria by the Chinese, who are the most industrious agriculturists of the world. Fine as these cereal crops are, beans are a still more important crop. They are grown in enormous quantities for their oil, which is used extensively by the Chinese for illuminating and cooking purposes. After the oil is extracted the beans are pressed into huge cakes, which are shipped from Newschwang to the southern ports of China, and there used as a fertilizer for sugar cane. Beans are also ground into a pulp and converted into a white jelly-like substance, which is called bean curd and highly relished by the Chinese. Cotton, tobacco and indigo are extensively cultivated. Cattle, sheep and hogs are to be seen everywhere in the farming districts of Manchuria, and mules, donkeys and ponies are so abundant as to be within the reach of all. Nowhere in China are the conditions for farming so favorable. The northern and western portions of Manchuria are mountainous or hilly, and the sparse population is for the most part non-Chinese and markedly inferior. It was not until 1820 that Chinese were allowed in the northern provinces, but recently they have fairly overrun the more desirable portions.

Manchuria possesses an immense source of wealth in her extensive forests of pine, oak and elm. Fortunately, these forests are so situated that logs may be easily floated down to the sea on the great rivers of the country. China proper now looks almost wholly to Manchuria for her lumber. At the mouth of the Yalu as many as 40,000 raftsmen are said to congregate in summer. Gold, silver, iron and coal are found in abundance, but the Chinese government has hitherto forbidden the development of the mines. Take it all in all, no part of China is more richly endowed by nature, and under the wise guidance of Russia, Manchuria is destined in the near future to astonish the world by her development. At present, the great drawbacks are bad government, bad roads, bad currency, brigandage and want of a proper mail service. We may be sure that Russia will speedily remedy all these defects. Brigandage, which now terrorizes large portions of the country, will be put down with a ruthless hand. Railroads will be pushed with all possible speed. Preliminary surveys have already been made, and large orders have been placed in the United States for steel rails and locomotives. The chief western import is cotton goods, and it is pleasant to add that they

are principally of American manufacture. Our commercial interests in Manchuria are larger than those of any other western nation, and capable of very great enlargement. It, therefore, behooves our government to be especially active in preserving the "open door" in that country. Our rights at Talien-wan have not yet been defined by Russia, but so long as the neighboring port of Newschang remains a Chinese treaty port, discriminating duties are not likely to be imposed at Talien-wan. We should join with England in demanding written assurances from China that, in any future concessions that may be granted in Manchuria, our present trading privileges shall be properly safeguarded. If we can receive unequivocal assurances of equality of opportunity with Russia in the Manchurian markets, we shall view her occupancy with unqualified approval. Even though an illiberal policy should be pursued at Talien-wan, the benefit accruing to us from the Russian control would far outweigh the evils. Certainly we have no share in the hysterical Russophobia just now so common in England. So long as Russia is kept beyond the Great Wall, her expansion in the Far East is viewed with favor rather than alarm by Americans. She is doing a highly important civilizing work in the outlying regions north and west of China, which no other European power would be permitted to do or could do so well.

Very different are the concessions recently secured from China by England. They involve no possible danger to our interests, and are certain to result in a greatly enlarged demand for American goods.

(1.) The valley of the Yangtse shall not be mortgaged, leased or ceded to any foreign power.

This is the richest and most populous portion of China. From this region come the tea and silk, which constitute the staple exports from China, and here American merchants find the chief market for our cotton goods and kerosene oil. Of course, the promise of China is utterly valueless in her present state of weakness, but it is incalculably important as showing the firm determination of England to keep open this immensely rich market. Whatever may befall in China, Americans are thus guaranteed free access to the Yangtse valley.

(2.) The inland waters of China shall be thrown open to the vessels of all nations.

This is far and away the most important commercial concession yet obtained from China since the opening of the country, and, if carried out in good faith, will revolutionize trade conditions. The chief obstacle to foreign trade has always been the local taxes, called *likin*. The Chinese people have been eager to purchase foreign goods, but the *likin* taxes, imposed between the port of entry and the home of the consumer, have raised the price of the goods beyond the means of the people. By treaty we have long had the right to pay $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. *ad valorem* at the port of entry, in commutation of the *likin* taxes. Transit passes have been issued, which were evidence of the payment of this tax, and were designed to secure the free passage of the goods covered through the *likin* stations. In practice the unscrupulous cunning of the mandarins has rendered these passes well nigh valueless. Under the present concession we shall be able to evade the mandarins by carrying our goods directly to the consumer under our own flag. China is a perfect network of waterways, and by the use of light draft steamers and launches we shall greatly increase the area of our markets. It is one thing to secure a right in China from the Peking Government. It is quite another to secure its recognition by the local officials. Much diplomatic pressure will have to be exerted at Peking before we shall enjoy this right to the full. Our Government should unreservedly co-operate with England in any action that may prove necessary to make this right practically useful.

(3.) In connection with the Anglo-German loan of £16,000,000 China has agreed that the *likin* taxes in the provinces of Kiangsu, Kiangsi, Hupeh, Chekiang and Nyanhwei, which are pledged as part security for the loan, shall be collected by the foreign custom service under Sir Robert Hart.

From what has been said concerning these taxes, it is apparent that this change will prove highly advantageous to foreign trade.

(4.) China has promised that the successor of Sir Robert Hart as Inspector General of the Imperial Maritime Customs shall be an Englishman, and that an Englishman shall hold this post so long as English trade predominates.

This is a position of very great power, and, in the capable hands of Sir Robert Hart, has done much to maintain English prestige in China. As England is the only power in China standing unequivocally for open markets, anything which enhances her influ-

ence at Peking works for American interests and should receive our hearty approval.

(5.) Funing, on the inlet of Sam Sa; Chinwang Peitaho, on the Gulf of Pe-chi-li, and Yo-chau, on the Tung-ting Lake, are opened to foreign trade.

(6.) Wei-hai-wei is leased to England on the same terms on which Port Arthur is leased to Russia.

Speaking of this lease as the leader of the Government in the House of Commons, Mr. Balfour said: "We offered, if they (Russia) would abstain from taking Port Arthur, to ourselves give a corresponding pledge to take no port on the Gulf of Pe-chi-li. But our offer was not accepted, and Great Britain has since obtained a lease of Wei-hai-wei on the same terms as those by which Russia secured Port Arthur. Wei-hai-wei is the only port on the Gulf of Pe-chi-li which might balance the possession of Port Arthur. While Port Arthur is stronger, the accommodation at Wei-hai-wei is inestimably greater, and by taking Wei-hai-wei under our protection we prevent the Gulf of Pe-chi-li from falling under the maritime control of one power, and thus defend our interests."

Opinion in England is very much divided as to the wisdom of this move, but Americans are undivided in the opinion that a strong British fortress at Wei-hai-wei between the Russians at Port Arthur and the Germans at Kiao-Chou will render American interests in North China more secure. The stronger England becomes in China the less likely are Russia, Germany and France to impose discriminating duties within their concessions.

(7.) A company of English capitalists has just received a sixty-year concession of the coal and iron fields in the Province of Shansi.

The value of this concession may be imagined when it is recalled that Baron Von Richtofen estimated that the anthracite alone of these fields would supply the world for 2,000 years. A railroad is already under construction through this region. This concession being secured against the strenuous opposition of Russia and France is a brilliant triumph for English diplomacy. The predominance of England in North China seems now assured and the threatened ascendancy of Russia in that region happily averted. It is a decisive victory for the policy of the "open door," in which we may well rejoice.

(8.) In 1897 England secured the opening of the West River to foreign trade as far as Wuchow, which was at the same time made a treaty port.

This is a concession that the foreign merchants at Canton and Hongkong have long sought. The West River is the natural channel for the foreign trade of Southeastern China. Hitherto this trade has been unnaturally restricted by the obstruction of the local officials. Already American kerosene oil is finding largely increased sale as a result of the opening of the river.

Last year Germany secured the following concessions. We quote the language of M. Von Brand, the then German Minister to China :

"China rents to Germany, for ninety-nine years the two promontories forming the entrance to the Bay of Kiao-Chou, and the water area of the bay up to high-water mark, with the islands in it; agreeing, at the same time, that nothing shall be done by the Chinese authorities within a radius of thirty-one English miles round the bay without the previous consent of the German authorities. China agrees further to give to a Chino-German railway company, to be formed, a concession for the construction of a railway from the Bay of Kiao-Chou to Tsinan-Fu, passing through Ichau-fu, and returning to the point of departure. It also grants to Germany the privilege of operating the coal mines at Weihsien, Joshansien and Ichau-fu, and promises further that in the event of works being undertaken in Shantung with the help of foreigners, German industry and commerce shall be first called into requisition."

These concessions do not seriously menace American interests. On the contrary, in so far as they open up hitherto inaccessible territory, they are distinctly advantageous. They will create new markets for American cotton goods and kerosene oil, a trade in which Germany and the United States are not competitors. Germany has given the world assurances that she will pursue an open policy at Kiao-Chou. Her interests in China are so manifestly on the side of the "open door" that we need have no great fear of discriminating duties. The powers in China are divided into two opposing parties. The United States, England and Germany desire the integrity of China, to the end that trade may be open to all on terms of entire equality. On the other hand, Russia and France, whose trade with China is comparatively insignificant and seemingly incapable of large increase, are actuated by a desire for territorial aggrandizement and exclusive privileges. Wherever the French flag flies in China, we may expect the same illiberal commercial policy that has blighted Tongking, Anam and Cochin

China. At present Kiao-Chou is commercially insignificant, and it will remain so until a railroad is constructed to Tsinan-fu.

Passing to the south we find France endeavoring, from her basis in Tongking and Kwang-chau-wan, to capture the trade of Kwangsi and Yunnan. Foreign trade in these provinces is as yet comparatively insignificant, but it is thought to be capable of enormous enlargement, especially in the rich Province of Yunnan. Just what direction this future trade will take is one of the interesting commercial problems of China. This region may be reached from Shanghai by way of the Yangtse; from Canton by way of the West River; from Tongking by way of the Red River and the proposed French railroad, and from Burmah by an extension of the English railroad. With a view of controlling this trade, France has secured the following concessions:

(1.) A lease of Kwang-chau-wan on the Leichau peninsula, in the Province of Kwangtung.

The harbor is a fine one, twenty miles long and land locked, with two entrances. The wide part of the harbor is about ten miles long from east to west and six or seven miles wide from north to south, with a depth and holding ground that will afford an open and safe anchorage for vessels of the largest draft. By this lease France secured the natural outlet for the trade of the Province of Kwangsi and an invaluable base for operations in Kwangsi, Kwangtung and Hainan.

(2.) The concession of a railroad connecting Tongking with Yunnan-fu by the Red River.

(3.) A promise by China not to alienate her territory bordering on Tongking.

(4.) A promise by China not to cede the island of Hainan to any other power.

(5.) In June, 1896, a French company secured the right to build a railroad from the frontier of Tongking to Lungchau, in Kwangsi, and in June, 1897, an extension of this road was authorized.

(6.) In June, 1895, France secured the right to trade at Lungchau in Kwangsi and at Mengtzu in Yunnan. Already a large trade has been built up at Mengtzu.

By these concessions France is given an immense advantage in the race for the markets of Southern China, but there is nothing in the commercial history of France in the Far East to justify the

belief that she can maintain the advantage against the English, who will reach these markets from Canton and Burmah.

The various concessions that have been enumerated are sure to make the present year the beginning of a new era for China. The country is at last fully open to foreign trade and presents to our merchants an unparalleled opportunity. Fortunately we are already in the field. Ever since the opening of China, our merchants have enjoyed a large share of the foreign trade, and to-day, at Shanghai, we have houses possessed of large capital and officered by able men of long experience in China, who are keenly alive to every opportunity for the extension of American trade. The men who have doubled American imports into China since 1893 are not likely to lag behind in the race for the new markets recently opened.

Our staple exports to China are cotton goods and kerosene oil. American clocks and watches have a large sale. Recently there has been a growing demand for our wheat flour. The railroad concessions recently secured will create a large demand for American locomotives and steel rails. Baldwin engines are used on the Tientsin-Peking Railroad, and the lead thus secured is not likely to be lost.

The total value of our exports to China last year was about \$20,000,000. The official statistics do not include the full value of the trade, for the reason that many goods find their way to China *via* England. The following statistics from the Statistical Abstract, 1898, show the declared value of our exports and the wonderful growth of the trade in recent years:

	1893.	1894.	1895.	1896.	1897.
American exports { to Chinese ports.. }	\$3,900,457	\$5,862,426	\$3,603,840	\$6,921,933	\$11,924,433
To Hong Kong.....	4,216,602	4,209,847	4,253,040	4,691,201	6,060,039
	\$8,117,059	\$10,072,273	\$7,856,880	\$11,613,134	\$17,984,472

The following table shows the growth in the leading articles of export :

<i>Flour :</i>	1893.	1897.
Chinese Ports.....	\$66,699	\$72,100
Hong Kong.....	2,059,576	3,332,241
	\$2,126,275	\$3,394,341

<i>Cotton Goods:</i>		1893.	1897.
Chinese Ports.....		\$1,638,657	\$7,438,203
Hong Kong.....		14,062	17,492
		<hr/> \$1,652,719	<hr/> \$7,455,695
<i>Kerosene Oil:</i>			
Chinese Ports.....		\$1,809,437	\$3,371,937
Hong Kong.....		842,313	1,157,050
		<hr/> \$2,651,750	<hr/> \$4,528,987

Under these conditions, what should be the policy of the United States? We have no desire to appropriate a single foot of Chinese territory, and as a government we are entirely indifferent to the balance of power in the Far East, except as it may affect our trade. The political considerations that enter into the relations of England and Russia in the north of China, and England and France to the south, do not concern us. Anything like a general alliance between this country and England in the Far East should be studiously avoided. While we sympathize with China and feel that in the interest of civilization her independence should be respected and maintained, under no circumstances that can be now foreseen would we fight to prevent a partition that did not involve the destruction of our present treaty rights. So long as entire equality of trading privileges is secured, the scramble of the powers in China for concessions will receive no active opposition from the United States. We are concerned with the integrity of Chinese trade, and not the integrity of Chinese territory. In this regard our interests and those of England differ. Otherwise they are identical and we can readily secure her co-operation in the furtherance of our policy. The sticking point with us is the preservation of our present treaty right of admission to the Chinese market upon terms of entire equality with every other nation. To this end our Government should join England in insisting, even to the point of war, upon an express stipulation in future grants of territory by China that our goods shall be admitted into the territory granted upon the same terms as the goods of the nation receiving the grant. We should also join England in employing every diplomatic means, short of a threat of war, to prevent the partition of China, because that event would be disastrous to American trade, although open markets were guaranteed. It is highly discreditable to American and English diplomacy that Talien-wan, Kiao-Chou and Kwang-chau-wan, the natural outlets of the rich provinces of Manchuria, Shantung and

Kwangsi, have been alienated by China without our interests being properly safeguarded. It would never have happened if the two governments had been acting together at Peking. In short, our policy in China should be, concert of action with England so far as our interests are identical, opposition to the partition of China by every means short of war, and opposition to partition or territorial grants even to the extremity of war if the preservation of our present treaty rights of trade cannot be guaranteed.

It has been urged that we are estopped from fighting for open markets in China because of our protective tariff at home. Nothing could well be more absurd. It is not a question of fighting for new rights, but for the preservation of rights we already possess. At present we have a treaty right of admission to all the markets of China through the "open ports" upon the payment of a nominal duty. Certain powers of Europe threaten this right by securing territorial concessions from China without insuring us against discriminating duties within the territory granted. It is not a question of China giving away her own. These concessions are forced from her. It is simply a question whether we shall weakly allow ourselves to be pushed out of valuable markets to which we have a possessory right.

The advantages of co-operating with England to the extent here advocated are obvious. No power or combination of powers would for a moment think of opposing the joint demand of England and the United States for open markets in China. The demand would be too reasonable and the combined strength too overwhelming. The powerful fleet of Japan would eagerly join those of England and the United States to sustain such a policy.

The only serious obstacles to this course of action lie in the historical enmity between this country and England and our traditional policy of avoiding alliances. Happily, recent events have done much to remove both these obstacles.

That there is much in the past relations of the two governments that makes co-operation difficult is too true, but in the noble language of Lowell, "these things should be remembered, not with resentment, but for enlightenment." Community of interests is fast overcoming every repulsion, and the feeling of the more open-minded and far-seeing men of both countries was eloquently expressed recently at the Mansion House by our Ambassador;

"The good understanding between us is based on something deeper than mere expediency. All who think cannot but see there is a sanction like that of religion which binds us in partnership in the serious work of the world. Whether we will or not, we are associated in that work by the very nature of things, and no man and no group of men can prevent it. We are bound by ties we did not forge and that we cannot break. We are joint ministers in the same sacred mission of freedom and progress, charged with duties we cannot evade by the imposition of irresistible hands."

The universal sympathy of Englishmen for us in our attempt to pacify Cuba and give the island the benefit of a liberal and just government is evidence that there is a patriotism of race as well as of country. In the presence of this sympathy, we forget our old animosities. England alone of European powers has fully recognized the disinterestedness of our motives. By peremptorily refusing even to consider an invitation from the Continental powers to intervene in the war she has placed us under a heavy debt of gratitude and rendered it altogether impossible for us to remember past grievances. The war has repaid its cost by disclosing to the world the solidarity of English-speaking peoples.

Recent events have also done much to remove the other obstacle to effective action in China. Cuba, Hawaii and the Philippines are teaching us that a policy of isolation is no longer possible. Changed conditions are forcing us unwillingly into a departure from our traditional policy of avoiding contact with the world at large. We are confronted by the unpleasant alternative of giving up cherished ideals or ignominiously shirking the duties of great power. Again and again our Government has failed to protect American interests with vigor and effect because of its irrational unwillingness to act in concert with other powers. We have pursued a weak and ineffectual policy of isolation when the conditions were such that co-operation with other powers was essential to the proper protection of our own interests. The policy of isolation has been rendered sacrosanct by the great name of Washington. Like all devotees of superstition we have clung to the words of the Farewell Address and ignored the spirit of the text. Washington spoke with reference to conditions then existing, and we do his memory a grave injustice in attributing to him an intention of recommending a permanent and inflexible policy

of isolation. He never allowed himself to be hampered by an unyielding policy. He did not think in formulæ. He had a strong affinity for facts and saw conditions as they were. His success in the field was largely due to the bewildering rapidity with which he changed his plans to conform to changed conditions. We should remember that he did not disdain the French alliance during the war. The Farewell Address does not warn us against all alliances, but only such as would not directly and materially promote our interests. Washington counselled a policy of isolation during the period of the nation's infancy and weakness. He had suffered throughout his administration from the provincialism of the masses and their proneness to take sides in the controversies of Europe. He therefore wisely counselled a policy of isolation. By failing to consider his words in the light of the conditions that provoked them, we have strangely misunderstood and misapplied this counsel. A temporary policy of isolation that was designed to protect the weakness of the infant republic has been irrationally converted into a permanent policy which thwarts and hampers us in our days of lusty manhood. One hundred years ago we occupied a narrow fringe of land along the Atlantic seaboard. Our white population was but three millions. We had no possession on the Pacific coast and the Mississippi Valley had not yet been acquired. We were living under a newly formed federal government which was a distasteful compromise, and had not yet won the undivided loyalty of the people. Our form of government was confessedly an experiment. In Europe absolutism held universal sway, save in France, where events were doing much to discredit democracy. We had not a friend in Europe whom we could trust, and our isolation was our safety. Fortunately, we were then farther removed from Europe than we now are from China. The wisdom of avoiding entangling alliances involving war, at that period of our extreme weakness, is so obvious that we can but marvel that it should have required all the strength of Washington's administration to keep the people from joining France in the war against England. A timid shrinking from contact with the world which was wise in those days of our infancy, when we were the weakest of nations, is grotesquely absurd now that we have become the strongest. Should we protect or extend American interests in any part of the world by temporary co-operation with a European power? It is thought a

sufficient condemnation of such a policy to repeat the hackneyed phrase against "entangling alliances." And thus the native hue of resolution is sicklied o'er by a phrase. In consequence we allow American property in Turkey to be destroyed with impunity and leave England to fight unaided for the preservation of our treaty rights in China. In consequence our whole foreign policy has been enervated and in particular our attitude toward Hawaii and Cuba has been weakly hesitant. This hallowed policy of isolation has had the natural result of producing provincial habits of thought among our public men, that make it difficult for them to consider our foreign policy along broad lines of national destiny. The Cuban war will prove the beginning of the end of the absurd attempt to guide the conduct of our years of maturity by the little prudential maxims of our infancy.

Our commercial necessities are also fast bringing home to the American people the inadequacy of their traditional foreign policy. We have been so long intent on discouraging imports that we have thought little of encouraging exports, but now that we have captured our own markets we are eager to invade the markets of the world. Indeed, the invasion has already begun. In 1894, the value of domestic manufactures exported from the United States was \$177,801,000, while in 1897 the value was \$279,617,000, an increase of about 57 per cent. American tools and machinery are the standard of the world. Our sewing machines, bicycles and typewriters lead in every market, and our locomotive engines are whistling at the gates of Peking. We are selling steel rails in London, India and Manchuria. The industrial capacity of the American people has outgrown the demands of the home market, and our merchants are in consequence making an energetic push into the markets of the world. It is certain they are accomplishing wonders unaided by government, but it is equally certain that our foreign trade would increase even more rapidly if our Government was as keenly active and resolutely bold in opening up new markets and furthering the efforts of our merchants as are the governments of Europe. We have long recognized the fact that the prosperity of the Western and Southern farmer depends largely upon the foreign markets. We are just beginning to realize that the prosperity of the Eastern artisan is equally dependent upon them. This revolution in industrial conditions demands a revolution in our foreign policy. The more

far-sighted of our statesmen are awakening to the necessity of finding foreign outlets for the overflowing industrial energy of the American people. Unless our eyes turn outward in search of foreign markets, they will soon turn inward upon discontent and dangerous political unrest among our industrial classes. This condition will force our Government to abandon its policy of indifference and adopt a policy of active intervention in foreign affairs, not for the purpose of territorial acquisition, but in the interest of open markets. Along these lines the two great branches of the English race seem destined to act in concert, with incalculable benefit to themselves and the world at large. Whatever disposition may be made of the Philippine Islands, it would be highly discreditable to American statesmanship if we failed to provide that they should forever remain open to our trade, free of all duties.

For many it has long seemed our ideal destiny to live apart, in complacent self-sufficiency, a recluse among the nations. Happily such an ideal is as impossible as it is ignoble and retrograde. Impelled by irresistible forces we are already beginning to look outward, and are preparing to take the high place among the nations to which our strength entitles us. We should be unworthy members of the stout-hearted race to which we belong if we were daunted by the burdens and dangers of the wider activities upon which we are entering.

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